Citizen Oversight Board

• Letter from the Board Chair
• Introduction
• Board Mission
• Overview of Denver’s Law Enforcement Discipline System
• Board Activities in 2022
• Board Meetings and Public Forums
• PID Policy Implementation
• Hiring an Independent Monitor
• Other Board Activities
• Notable City Events
• Evaluation of OIM
• Workload and Performance Data
• OIM Staff Survey
• Public Safety Feedback
• Board Assessment
• Assessment of DOS Disciplinary Processes
• Community Concerns
• Board Concerns
• Recommendations
• 2022 Recommendations
• Status of Prior Recommendations
• Appendix A: Strategic Plan Overview
• Appendix B: Board Membership
• Appendix C: Contact Information

Greetings,

I welcome you to the Denver Citizen Oversight Board’s annual report for 2022, and I’m proud to highlight a few of the things we’ve accomplished. In February, the Board exercised its newfound authority to select the next Independent Monitor by deciding not to hire any candidate from the first round of recruiting. We then coordinated a new search and selection process, as well as updating the position’s job description and pay grade. After extensive community involvement and partnership, we selected local defense attorney Lisabeth Pérez Castle for the position. We’re thrilled to have her lead the Office of the Independent Monitor and eager to partner with her moving forward.

In addition, the Board engaged in a strategic planning effort and identified a number of objectives for the next two years focused on three strategic areas: 1) Adequate Funding and Operational Resources; 2) Sustained Stakeholder Support: Community Outreach and Involvement; and 3) Unfettered Access to Records and Facilities; Public Reporting and Transparency. We’ve already made progress on several of our objectives, and I’m confident that our progress will accelerate as the new year gets underway.

Core to our mission, we’ve also been paying close attention to the Department of Public Safety. Sadly, 2022 was marked with several human tragedies in Denver and beyond. This report highlights a number of concerns stemming from these and other incidents. As a Board, we are dedicated to ensuring that each of these events leads to lasting and meaningful change.

But there has also been progress, particularly in the form of significant investments in support-oriented services across almost every facet of public safety. A few examples you may not have heard about include that the:

• Support Team Assisted Response (STAR) program was dramatically expanded;
• Co-responder program, which pairs mental health professionals with law enforcement officers, continued to grow both within the Police Department and in other public safety agencies like the Fire Department and Park Rangers;
• Department of Public Safety opened a new Assessment-Intake-Diversion Center where certain low-level offenders can now avoid arrest and instead get immediately connected with available services in a supportive environment, should they want to; and
• Sheriff Department is working to better support inmates undergoing treatment for opioid misuse with a dedicated housing unit that makes it easier to provide treatment and related services.

Change is not just possible, but happening, even if in small local ways. I hope you find that as encouraging as we do.

Sincerely,

Julia Richman, Chair

Denver’s Citizen Oversight Board (COB or Board) was created in 2004 and consists of nine community members who are broadly tasked with assessing the effectiveness of the Denver Department of Public Safety’s (DOS) hiring, training, and disciplinary processes and making recommendations as appropriate. In order to do so, the Board is granted regular access to public safety department leaders as well as confidential records. The Board is also responsible for appointing, by and with the consent of the City Council, the Independent Monitor, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Board. The Independent Monitor leads the Office of the Independent Monitor (OIM), the overall performance of which the Board is also responsible for evaluating. Board members serve four-year terms and are appointed alternately by the Mayor and City Council, with one joint appointee. They also receive a stipend of $100 per month. By ordinance, the Board is required to annually report on its activities, findings, and recommendations. This annual report covers the period from January 1 through December 31, 2022.

The duties and authorities of the COB are established in of the City and County of Denver Charter, as follows:

The DOS is headed by the Executive Director of Public Safety (EDOS) and staffed with civilians. The EDOS is a Mayoral appointee and is responsible for, among other things, managing the Denver Fire Department (DFD), Denver Police Department (DPD), Denver Sheriff Department (DSD), and the 911 Emergency Communications Division. The Mayor also appoints the heads of the DFD, DPD, and DSD.

Public safety employees fall into one of two groups: civilian employees and those with badges and guns, who are sometimes called sworn, uniformed, or classified service employees. The approximately 1,600 police officers, 875 sheriff deputies, and 15 fire investigators with badges and guns will be collectively described in this annual report as “uniformed personnel.”

Any member of the community can file a complaint against any uniformed personnel that they believe may have acted improperly. Complaints can be filed anonymously and can be made by anyone, including witnesses or those who heard about an incident from someone else. Complaint topics can include disrespectful treatment, improper use of force, or any other allegation against specific uniformed personnel, regardless of whether the complainant knows their name(s) or badge number(s). Complaints can be provided to the COB, the OIM, or directly to the applicable department’s internal investigative office. The easiest way to file a complaint or commendation related to the DPD or DSD is through the OIM’s online form.1 The DFD has an online form available as well.2

Historically, both DPD and DSD had their own internal affairs offices that were responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct concerning uniformed personnel and recommending appropriate discipline. This is still the case for the DPD, which has both an Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) responsible for initial screening of complaints, gathering evidence, and conducting interviews and a Conduct Review

Bureau (CRB, often also referred to as the Conduct Review Office or CRO) responsible for evaluating the evidence and making initial disciplinary recommendations. However, the DSD’s internal affairs division was replaced in 2019 by a Public Integrity Division (PID) within the DOS. The PID consists of an Administrative Investigations Unit (AIU) and a Conduct Review Unit (CRU), which have responsibilities similar to their DPD counterparts. While complaints can be made through many channels, complaints about DSD uniformed personnel go first to AIU, then CRU, and then to the Sheriff. Complaints about DPD uniformed personnel go first to IAB, then CRB, and then to the Chief of Police. While reprimands can be issued by the Chief of Police, Sheriff, or EDOS, the EDOS is responsible for the final decision on any discipline for uniformed personnel more severe than a reprimand.3 This process is the same regardless of whether a complaint is initially submitted to the Board, the OIM, the DSD’s Grievance and Incident Review Team (GIRT), or directly to AIU or IAB.4

After the EDOS makes the department’s final discipline decision, police officers and fire investigators are able to appeal that decision to the Civil Service Commission. Sheriff deputies and most civilian employees can similarly appeal to the Career Service Board. They can further appeal their decisions through the court system as well if they believe their discipline violated state or federal laws.

The OIM and the COB were created in 2004 in order to increase public trust in the internal misconduct investigations of uniformed personnel. Their creation was part of the reforms that were demanded in the wake of the fatal 2003 police shooting of Paul Childs, a developmentally disabled teenager. They replaced the Public Safety Review Commission, which was perceived to be ineffective.

The OIM is responsible for monitoring all aspects of the investigatory and disciplinary process for uniformed personnel and typically does so by reviewing records and making recommendations after each stage of the process is completed. This includes reviewing cases that the law enforcement review units wish to close after an initial screening. If the OIM so chooses, they can also “actively monitor” a case. When the OIM actively monitors a case, its staff works closely with the investigators—including attending relevant interviews—and can provide feedback and recommendations in real-time. If the investigating unit declines the OIM’s recommendations, the OIM has the authority to conduct its own supplemental investigation. The OIM is also tasked with reporting on overall trends in complaints and discipline, which can inform policy recommendations.

The goal of this oversight system is for Denver residents to have faith that their complaints will be handled properly, that the resulting investigation will be thorough, and that those in charge will hear an independent perspective before they make any disciplinary decisions.

The Board is not directly involved in each step of the investigatory and disciplinary process like the OIM, but is able to review confidential records and provide recommendations for both specific cases and general policies as it sees fit. The Board is also tasked with appointing the head of the OIM (with the consent of the City Council) and independently evaluating the effectiveness of the office.

Denver’s Support Team Assisted Response (STAR) program experienced significant growth throughout 2022.8 On February 14, City Council unanimously approved a $1.4 million contract to continue and significantly expand the STAR program over the course of the year.9 With additional funds from Caring for Denver, this gave the program an annual operating budget of $3.9 million.10 In June, an academic paper was published finding that the STAR program reduced reports of low-level offenses by 34% in the areas it was active, in addition to being very cost-effective.11 Also in June, the City Council approved an additional $526,610 to purchase 5 new vans for the program.12 In October, the City approved a $2.3 million contract with Servicios de la Raza to provide a local network of wrap-around services as a new part of the STAR program.13 A $2.5 million contract for 2023 was introduced in November 2022, pointing to the program’s continued growth in 2023.14

On March 25, a federal jury ordered the City and County of Denver to pay $14 million to 12 plaintiffs as a result of the DPD’s actions during the George Floyd protests in the summer of 2020. The jury found that the plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment rights had been violated as a result of the DPD’s policies and practices. In 2022, City Council also approved five settlements related to the DPD’s conduct during the George Floyd protests at a cost of $1.75 million. An additional $1.75 million was spent settling 15 other settlements related to the DPD. City Council also approved two settlements worth $290,000 related to the conduct of the DSD.

On May 9, the DSD dedicated one of its housing pods specifically to inmates who are participating in the Department’s pre-existing Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) program. Participation in the program, which is aimed at combating opioid addiction, is voluntary and the pod has capacity to house approximately 60 inmates. As a result, 578 inmates participated in the MAT program in 2022, more than twice as many as 2021.

On July 17, during the early morning “out crowd” that occurs when Lower Downtown (LoDo) bars close, three DPD officers fired at Jordan Waddy, injuring him and six other bystanders near the intersection of 20th and Larimer Streets. The Board issued a public statement on August 9, in which it committed to “take every step in our power to ensure that the investigative process is worthy of the community’s trust” and communicate about the process and seek to improve any deficiencies it found. The body camera and related other footage was released on August 16. Neither the OIM nor the COB had independent or direct access to the relevant video files prior to the footage’s public release.16 This limited the Board’s ability to serve as an independent and trustworthy voice to the community. That day, Denver District Attorney Beth McCann announced that she was convening a grand jury to investigate the incident.17 Once the criminal proceedings are completed, the DPD will conduct an administrative review to determine if any policies were violated and if disciplinary actions are warranted.

On August 31, DPD Chief Paul Pazen announced his retirement, and the Mayor appointed Division Chief of Patrol Ron Thomas to serve as Acting Chief. Thomas’s appointment as Chief was confirmed by City Council on October 18.

On March 25, a federal jury ordered the City and County of Denver to pay $14 million to 12 plaintiffs as a result of the DPD’s actions during the George Floyd protests in the summer of 2020. The jury found that the plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment rights had been violated as a result of the DPD’s policies and practices. In 2022, City Council also approved five settlements related to the DPD’s conduct during the George Floyd protests at a cost of $1.75 million. An additional $1.75 million was spent settling 15 other settlements related to the DPD. City Council also approved two settlements worth $290,000 related to the conduct of the DSD.

On May 9, the DSD dedicated one of its housing pods specifically to inmates who are participating in the Department’s pre-existing Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) program. Participation in the program, which is aimed at combating opioid addiction, is voluntary and the pod has capacity to house approximately 60 inmates. As a result, 578 inmates participated in the MAT program in 2022, more than twice as many as 2021.

On July 17, during the early morning “out crowd” that occurs when Lower Downtown (LoDo) bars close, three DPD officers fired at Jordan Waddy, injuring him and six other bystanders near the intersection of 20th and Larimer Streets. The Board issued a public statement on August 9, in which it committed to “take every step in our power to ensure that the investigative process is worthy of the community’s trust” and communicate about the process and seek to improve any deficiencies it found. The body camera and related other footage was released on August 16. Neither the OIM nor the COB had independent or direct access to the relevant video files prior to the footage’s public release.16 This limited the Board’s ability to serve as an independent and trustworthy voice to the community. That day, Denver District Attorney Beth McCann announced that she was convening a grand jury to investigate the incident.17 Once the criminal proceedings are completed, the DPD will conduct an administrative review to determine if any policies were violated and if disciplinary actions are warranted.

On August 31, DPD Chief Paul Pazen announced his retirement, and the Mayor appointed Division Chief of Patrol Ron Thomas to serve as Acting Chief. Thomas’s appointment as Chief was confirmed by City Council on October 18.

On September 12, City Council approved an amendment to the City’s contract with WellPower (formerly Mental Health Center of Denver) to provide three mental health clinicians who will participate in a co- responder program with the Fire Department and Park Rangers.18

On November 8, Fire Chief Desmond Fulton revised several policies related to discipline for DFD employees. These policy revisions formalized several pre-existing practices, including referring misconduct allegations against DFD leadership and DFD Internal Affairs personnel to the Public Integrity Division for an independent investigation, completing misconduct investigations even if the subject employee resigns, and promptly notifying the OIM in cases where they have jurisdiction.

On November 14, City Council approved the City’s budget for 2023. Numerous changes were related to public safety, but two specific changes are highlighted here:

1. The budget re-allocates funds for the DFD to move Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) training in-house instead of relying on Denver Health. Relatedly, the City’s 2023 contract with Denver Health also allows trained DFD first responders to immediately provide advanced life support services, such as administering intra-veinous medications, rather than waiting for Denver Health personnel to arrive.
2. The budget funds the creation of a new “public health hot spot” program, which will “provide a proactive, multi-agency approach to addressing mental, health and social issues” in specific areas with a higher concentrations of public health needs. The team will consist of two outreach coordinators, two emergency medical technicians, and three therapists.

On November 21, the DOS soft-launched their new Assessment-Intake-Diversion (AID) Center and began serving community members in need of services.19 Logistical and programmatic work on the AID Center continued into 2023.

On December 16, EDOS Saldate informed the Board that a policy requiring the DPD to promptly share footage of critical incidents with the OIM and the Board was in the final stages of legal review. This policy change was requested by the Board after the July 17 officer involved shooting in LoDo.

Also on December 16, EDOS Saldate informed the Board that he will be initiating a formal process to review the feasibility of changing body worn camera settings so that they include audio in the 30-second buffer recording prior to the camera’s activation. This commitment comes after the Board asked EDOS Saldate, Chief Thomas, and former Chief Pazen a variety of questions related to this subject over the course of the year.20

The COB uses a four-pronged approach to evaluate the OIM:

Across the board, the OIM’s complaint-driven workload increased significantly in 2022, with a particularly large 72% increase in complaints against the DSD and corresponding increases in the number of investigations reviewed and actively monitored. The OIM’s outreach activities also increased significantly, although they still remain less than pre-pandemic levels.

Mediations of complaints decreased from what were already pandemic lows. However, the OIM has no direct control over the number of mediations that occur. All of the involved parties must agree to mediation.

The OIM provides more details about each critical incident (officer involved shootings and deaths in custody or during law enforcement contact) in their annual and semi-annual reports.

The Board provided the Sheriff, Chief of Police, and EDOS with the opportunity to share their feedback on the OIM’s performance in 2022. Only Chief Thomas provided feedback, stating that “the office operated as expected and generally in accordance with their mandate.” As a potential area of improvement, he also shared that OIM’s response times were sometimes slower than preferred.

Board members were asked to evaluate the Interim Independent Monitor’s performance across ten key areas. The following entries reflect the consensus of the Board.

Community Concerns

While the Board is legally required to maintain the confidentiality of misconduct investigations, community members sometimes share their concerns in public settings and the DOS publicly shares information about some closed cases when they result in significant discipline. This section summarizes notable concerns that members of the community have shared with the Board.

The In-Custody Death of Leroy Taylor

On February 9, 2022, Leroy Taylor died while in the custody of the DSD. Subsequent statements to the media from Taylor’s family, cellmate, and other inmates provided more information to the public. Taylor was diagnosed with COVID-19 on February 1 and taken to the hospital. On February 5, he returned to the Downtown Detention Center after testing negative. Over the next four days, Taylor complained of serious and worsening symptoms, including chest pain, difficulty breathing and swallowing, and that his hands and legs were turning blue. 24 By February 7, his public defender described him as barely audible and claimed in an emergency motion for his release that Denver Health and Hospital Authority (DHHA or Denver Health) had denied his request to remain at the hospital because too many inmates were in need of medical care.25 DSD deputies took Taylor to the medical ward five times in the days before and the day of his death, but Denver Health allegedly did not provide any medical care, and gave him ice chips before sending him back to his cell.26 Over a week after his death, media reports announced that Denver Health had suspended the charge nurse involved, although Denver Health never publicly confirmed the action.27

On March 4, community member Thomas Hernandez publicly shared his concerns with the Board, highlighting additional questions about when and how Taylor was pronounced as deceased and the availability of healthcare to inmates, especially those in COVID-positive housing pods.

Three different investigations were opened following the incident: DPD investigated whether the death was a homicide or otherwise the result of criminal actions, the PID investigated whether any DSD deputies violated departmental policies, and Denver Health investigated the conduct of their employees. DPD and the PID completed and closed their investigations without taking further action. Throughout 2022, the Board asked Sheriff Elias Diggins and EDOS Saldate if they had received or reviewed a copy of Denver Health’s internal investigation. Neither received such a report.28

The events surrounding Taylor’s death are particularly concerning to the Board, as they point to a gap in accountability and oversight concerning medical care provided to inmates. Each year, the City and County of Denver contracts with Denver Health, a state-level public entity, for a wide variety of services, including health care for inmates. The Sheriff is ultimately responsible for conditions in the jails, which and complex undertaking—by contracting with Denver Health.

Inmates who believe they were mistreated by Denver Health staff can and do file complaints. In January 2022, Denver Health informed the Board that it receives, on average, over 150 inmate complaints each month concerning its medical care services.29 Unfortunately, the Board and the OIM have no insight into how those complaints are ultimately handled by Denver Health. The OIM’s case monitoring jurisdiction is limited to uniformed personnel and AIU’s governing policy language similarly does not provide for investigations into the conduct of civilian or contracted staff. As a result, when the AIU receives a complaint related to medical care, they simply forward it to Denver Health and then close the case in their system.

In general, there are disincentives for Denver Health to conduct thorough investigations or be transparent about their investigative findings. Such transparency may create liability risks as well as risks to their contract with the City and reputation with the public. However, this should not outweigh a full and fair assessment of the merits of any complaint against Denver Health’s medical personnel and the disclosure of the results of that assessment.

A media report from early 2022 describes an instance that supports the Board’s concerns about Denver Health’s ability to police itself: In November 2021, a Denver Firefighter witnessed concerning behavior by a paramedic and filed a complaint about it.30 According to the complaint, a Denver Health paramedic encouraged a victim of domestic violence with a head injury to walk to a hospital rather than take an ambulance. The complaint also stated that the paramedic said the hospital was 4 blocks away when in reality it was over a mile—closer to 14 blocks—away. The article quoted DFD Chief Desmond Fulton as saying: “There would never be a plausible reason to tell a person to walk 14 blocks to a hospital.” Nevertheless, Denver Health reportedly cleared their staff of any wrongdoing, and did so without ever talking to the firefighter who complained or the subject paramedic. “I believe in our people and I trust them,” Denver Health Chief Paramedic Gary Bryskiewicz told the media.

While in-custody deaths are uncommon in Denver jails, the COB is concerned that the current level of oversight is not sufficiently transparent for this Board to trust that Denver Health is appropriately handling individual cases of alleged misconduct. In addition, oversight is not just about accountability— assigning blame and then discipline—but also about identifying areas where, even if no misconduct occurred, service can be improved and future tragedies can be avoided.

As it stands, the most effective tool available to inmates who feel they have been mistreated is a private lawsuit. It is, however, unreasonable to assume that inmates have the financial resources to use that tool. Further complicating the situation, an inmate under the care of Denver Health likely has little to no direct access to relevant evidence and cannot easily tell if the medical treatment they received violated policy, given that Denver Health does not publicize any of their policies.

The Board is concerned about the limited information available about how well this partnership between Denver Health and DSD is working. While the Sheriff appears to believe that DSD has sufficient internal mechanisms for accountability and that Denver Health provides quality care to inmates, it does not appear that Denver Health regularly provides the DSD with documentation related to complaint resolution or internal investigations. The Board will seek additional information in 2023 about the mechanisms for accountability, their breadth and effectiveness, as well as data about the frequency, subject matter, and disposition of healthcare complaints. 33

Community member Ma Kaing was shot and killed on July 15, 2022, when a group of young men on the other side of the street opened fire on a passing vehicle. DPD arrested four men in August and believe an unidentified fifth suspect may remain at large.

Kaing’s tragic death brought increased attention to how 911 calls are dispatched in the East Colfax community, which borders the city of Aurora. When Kaing’s son dialed 911, the nearest Verizon cell tower was in Aurora, and his call was incorrectly routed to Aurora’s 911 call center. He waited on hold for almost 4 minutes before connecting with Denver’s 911 call center.

In August, Verizon announced that it would begin providing more accurate location-based routing services in Denver and nationwide in early 2023. That technology routes calls to 911 based on a user’s GPS location, rather than the location of the nearest cell tower. Unlike other major carriers, Verizon had reportedly declined a prior request from Denver to implement the technology.

While the call routing issue appears to be in the process of being resolved, community members from the East Colfax community shared three additional concerns with the Board in September. Specifically, they expressed: 1) concerns with how Denver’s 911 call center handles calls in languages other than English or Spanish;36 2) suspicion that Denver 911 dispatchers might be deprioritizing calls in their community, such as reported gunfire, as compared to other communities; and 3) suspicion that DPD has under-resourced their community, resulting in significantly slower or nonexistent police responses compared to similar emergencies in other Denver communities.

The Board looks forward to helping these community members access and review data relevant to their concerns in 2023.

Denver’s STAR program is an alternative-response model in which a van with a paramedic and a mental health specialist is dispatched to certain 911 calls instead of DPD officers. Officers can also request that STAR assume responsibility for calls that they respond to initially. The STAR program is managed by the Denver Department of Public Health and Environment (DDPHE), which works closely with the DOS’s 911 Call Center to implement the program. DDPHE contracts with WellPower (formerly named Mental Health Center of Denver) to provide the necessary mental health professionals and with Denver Health to provide paramedics.

The program started as a pilot in 2020, was made permanent in 2021, and expanded significantly in 2022. In 2021, DDPHE created the STAR Community Advisory Committee (SCAC), which consisted of 15 volunteers, several of whom played a role in the creation of the STAR program. Over the following year DDPHE and the SCAC had different ideas about the purpose of the committee and how much authority, if any, it should have over the program. Tensions rose significantly over the summer of 2022, when a DDPHE staffer unilaterally ended the committee’s monthly virtual meeting after committee members criticized an email sent by the staffer as racist. In their next meeting, DDPHE Executive Director Bob McDonald attended and appeared to take meaningful steps toward reconciliation by re-assigning the staffer and offering additional authority to the committee. However, prior to the committee’s next meeting, DDPHE cancelled all SCAC meetings “for the next couple of months” while they restructure the committee and more clearly define its role.37 In an unofficial public meeting afterwards, SCAC members described a complete breakdown in communications and trust with DDPHE and even suggested advocating that STAR be removed from DDPHE’s management in the future.

The Board is deeply concerned by the breakdown in communications between DDPHE and the SCAC and the potential for that conflict to broadly undermine the community’s trust in the STAR program. The Board will examine this issue more closely in 2023.

On September 5, 2021, community member Gene McCullough died while riding his bike in western Denver. According to a disciplinary order issued in August, the DPD Detective assigned to investigate the death “failed to perform a reasonable investigation,” including not visiting the scene of the death to take pictures until over five weeks later, accompanied by his sergeant.38 In December 2021, the detective, once again accompanied by his sergeant, returned to the scene to take measurements with a laser scanner.

Later in December, after one of McCullough’s relatives filed a complaint about the inadequate investigation, the detective’s second-level manager, a lieutenant, got involved. He emailed both the detective and his sergeant a list of five items needed to complete the investigation. Four months later, the end of April 2022, those five items had still not been completed and added to the report.

The DPD did not find any evidence that McCullough was the victim of a crime, but McCullough’s family is skeptical that a single-person bicycle accident could be fatal for an experienced biker wearing a helmet. The DPD’s failure to conduct a reasonable investigation has done little to reassure them.

After a disciplinary investigation, the detective was fined 2 days of leave for failing to file a proper report.

McCullough’s relative, who filed the initial complaint, believes that the discipline imposed was insufficient, and also shared concerns with the Board about the way the case’s findings were communicated to him. In September 2022, the Board Chair emailed EDOS Saldate and requested that he arrange for someone to call McCullough’s relative and address his concerns about the adequacy of the discipline. The Chair also requested that the DOS work with the OIM to identify and address the reason why neither the DPD nor the DOS notified the complainant of an additional sustained policy violation related to his complaint that resulted in a written reprimand for another officer. 39 Over a month later, the relative told the Board that he never received such a call nor any additional explanation from the DOS, and he later expressed that he no longer has any faith in the DPD or DOS.

The Board sympathizes with the concerns expressed by McCullough’s relative. In any context, it is incredibly frustrating to be dependent on someone who is not doing their job. The intensity of that frustration understandably multiplies when the matter involves the unexpected death of a loved one.

AIU Complaint Triage Practices

In last year’s annual report, the Board highlighted concerns about the AIU’s use of ad hoc spreadsheets to manage their intake process. Those concerns were subsequently addressed when AIU agreed to use the IAPro database to track all incoming complaints, which began in January 2022, and was formalized in AIU’s policy documents in June 2022.

In those new policies, the AIU is authorized to refer certain complaints back to the DSD for investigation rather than open a formal AIU investigation. To the extent that complaints do not clearly allege deputy misconduct, the Board takes no position on the practice of referring these complaints back to the DSD from the AIU.

However, as EDOS Saldate acknowledged in a December 16, 2022, meeting with the Board, there have been deficiencies in the referral process. For example, it has not always been clear why the AIU refers a case to the DSD for investigation. He mentioned several steps that are being considered to address the issue, but the Board is not aware of any actions or policy changes that took place in 2022 related to the Board’s concerns.

It is the Board’s position that the DSD should not be investigating any complaints of deputy misconduct. First, it is not their job to do so and it has not been since 2019, when the AIU was created and the DSD’s Internal Affairs team was disbanded. Second, the DSD’s uniformed personnel are seriously understaffed and are required to work overtime each week. As such, the AIU should be very hesitant to place any additional burdens on their time. Third, such investigations create potential conflicts of interest with DSD staff investigating their own peers.

Not including contracted or on-call workers, the DSD is authorized to employ 875 full-time uniformed personnel and 254 full-time civilians. Despite 2022 being named the DSD’s “Year of Retention” and the continued efforts of the DSD, DOS, and Mayor’s Office, DSD began 2022 with 636 uniformed personnel and 174 civilians and ended with 570 uniformed personnel and 177 civilians.40 This has resulted in mandatory overtime for all uniformed employees, and it is not uncommon for deputies to work 14 – 16- hour shifts.

Adequate staffing is of particular concern to the Board as it has a direct impact on the quality of life and mental health of both inmates and Sheriff deputies. The impact to inmates includes the amount of time they are allowed to be outside their cells (“out time”), the frequency they may shower, and the extent of programming available to them (such as continuing education, job training, and recovery programs). Long shifts and extensive overtime work can also degrade the mental health of deputies. Relevant research shows that long work hours have the potential to threaten not just officer decision-making and performance, but also their health and safety.41 The Board is also concerned about the potential for more use of force incidents when deputies may lack the emotional capacity or energy to safely de- escalate high-stress situations. The Board asked Sheriff Diggins to look into the available data to see if it supports the Board’s concerns.

In a November 2022 meeting with the Board, Sheriff Diggins outlined his four-part plan to address recruitment and retention. It includes weekly and monthly minimums for overtime work to spread out the work and provide additional scheduling predictability, salary increases and bonuses, morale boosting activities, and expedited training programs for individuals with prior experience working for the DSD or in other correctional facilities.

The Board believes that Sheriff Diggins is taking the staffing challenge seriously. We support his efforts to improve DSD staffing levels and eventually eliminate the need for mandatory overtime work. Nevertheless, we emphasize that additional and sustained attention to this issue is required.

On July 17th, 2022, during the early morning “out crowd” that occurs when downtown bars close, three DPD officers attempted to stop Jordan Waddy. Waddy had previously been involved in an altercation and had a handgun in his hoodie pocket. As he removed and discarded his handgun, three officers fired at least 7 bullets at him. As a result, Waddy and six other bystanders were injured.

In the week after the shooting, the DPD provided a briefing on the case. A month after the incident, the body camera footage was publicly released. The Board did not have access to any of the footage prior to its public release. The OIM was allowed to view parts of the footage on two occasions, but similarly lacked direct or independent access that would facilitate close review. As a result, the COB’s ability to verify the DPD’s narrative of the incident was limited, particularly as it related to Waddy’s handling of his gun before the officers fired their weapons.

Relatedly, of the body camera footage shared publicly, only one officer activated their body worn camera prior to the shooting. At the time of this incident, DPD’s body cameras kept a rolling 30 seconds of video footage in a buffer recording, which is saved when the camera is activated. However, the cameras did not capture audio in their buffer recordings, and available audio from the one officer begins only 3 seconds prior to the shooting, limiting our understanding of the context and any orders or instructions the officers may have given prior to firing their weapons.

On December 16, 2022, EDOS Saldate informed the Board that he is in the process of approving a policy change requiring that footage of critical incidents be promptly and consistently uploaded into the IAPro database. The Board is grateful to EDOS Saldate for his openness to this policy change and hopes to see this issue resolved in 2023.

The DPD’s Use of Force Review Board is responsible for reviewing all officer uses of force that involve death, serious bodily injury, or officers discharging their firearm.42 The Board is composed of 5 voting members: 2 DPD Commanders (Major Crimes + Rotation), 2 Denver community members, and 1 member from another Colorado law enforcement agency. The DPD selects and trains the community member participants, and the Chief of Police selects the partnering law enforcement agency.

The OIM attends all of the Review Board’s meetings and can typically provide comments and ask questions but does not have a defined role in the proceedings.

The DPD’s Use of Force Review Board’s proceedings are protected by the privilege of deliberative process.43 As a result, the COB is very limited in the details that it can publicly report about the Review Board’s operations.

However, there are fundamental aspects of this body that the COB has concerns about, particularly given the importance of reviewing use of force incidents by the DPD. At its most basic level, the Review Board is neither transparent nor independent. All of its members are either employed by or hand-picked by the DPD, the names of its members are not public, and all of its proceedings are shielded from disclosure by the DPD’s deliberative process privilege.

Then-Mayor John Hickenlooper added community participants to the DPD’s Use of Force Review Board around the same time that the COB and OIM were created.44 If his intention was to improve the Use of Force Review Board’s transparency, increase its legitimacy, or ensure that a meaningful variety of perspectives are represented, it did not. It is the position of the COB that trust in the review and discipline process is earned through transparency and meaningful engagement with diverse views.

City ordinance empowers and requires the Board to make and publish recommendations for how Denver’s public safety agencies can both improve their relationships with the public and improve their policies or rules related to the hiring, training, or complaint processes. Additionally, Denver’s Charter empowers the Board to “address any other issues of concern to the community.”